(Don't) Make My Vote Count

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the ‘tyranny of the majority’ problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule in a close election, while they are independent of the electoral rule when the expected size of the minority tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group; this effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We provide a general version of the competition effect, i.e. that turnout in close elections is higher than in biased elections, independently of the systems adopted in the two cases

Brentano’s lectures on positivism (1893-1894) and his relationship to Ernst Mach

This paper is mainly about Brentano’s commentaries on Ernst Mach in his lectures “Contemporary philosophical questions” which he held one year before he left Austria. I will first identify the main sources of Brentano’s interests in Comte’s and J. S. Mill’s positivism during his Würzburg period. The second section provides a short overview of Brentano’s 1893-1894 lectures and his criticism of Comte, Kirchhoff, and Mill. The next sections bear on Brentano’s criticism of Mach’s monism and Brentano’s argument against the reduction of the mental based on his theory of intentionality. The last section is about Brentano’s proposal to replace the identity relation in Mach’s theory of elements by that of intentional correlation. I conclude with a remark on the history of philosophy in Austria

Like trainer, like bot? Inheritance of bias in algorithmic content moderation

The internet has become a central medium through which `networked publics' express their opinions and engage in debate. Offensive comments and personal attacks can inhibit participation in these spaces. Automated content moderation aims to overcome this problem using machine learning classifiers trained on large corpora of texts manually annotated for offence. While such systems could help encourage more civil debate, they must navigate inherently normatively contestable boundaries, and are subject to the idiosyncratic norms of the human raters who provide the training data. An important objective for platforms implementing such measures might be to ensure that they are not unduly biased towards or against particular norms of offence. This paper provides some exploratory methods by which the normative biases of algorithmic content moderation systems can be measured, by way of a case study using an existing dataset of comments labelled for offence. We train classifiers on comments labelled by different demographic subsets (men and women) to understand how differences in conceptions of offence between these groups might affect the performance of the resulting models on various test sets. We conclude by discussing some of the ethical choices facing the implementers of algorithmic moderation systems, given various desired levels of diversity of viewpoints amongst discussion participants.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, 9th International Conference on Social Informatics (SocInfo 2017), Oxford, UK, 13--15 September 2017 (forthcoming in Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy)

In the hunt for a better--and more substantial--awareness of the “law,” The author intends to analyze the different notions related to the “rule of law” and to criticize the conceptions that equate it either to the sum of “law” and “rule” or to the formal assertion that “law rules,” regardless of its relationship to certain principles, including both “negative” and “positive” liberties. Instead, he pretends to scrutinize the principles of the “rule of law,” in general, and in a “constitutional democracy,” in particular, to conclude that the tendency to reduce the “democratic principle” to the “majority rule” (or “majority principle”), i.e. to whatever pleases the majority, as part of the “positive liberty,” is contrary both to the “negative liberty” and to the “rule of law” itself

The assumptions of ethical rationing: an unreasonable man's response to Magelssen et al.

Contributors to the debate on ethical rationing bring with them assumptions about the proper role of moral theories in practical discourse, which seem reasonable, realistic and pragmatic. These assumptions function to define the remit of bioethical discourse and to determine conceptions of proper methodology and causal reasoning in the area. However well intentioned, the desire to be realistic in this sense may lead us to judge the adequacy of a theory precisely with reference to its ability to deliver apparently determinate answers to questions that strike most practitioners and patients as morally arbitrary. By providing ethical solutions that work given the world as it is, work in clinical ethics may serve to endorse or protect from scrutiny the very structures that need to change if real moral progress is to be possible. Such work can help to foster the illusion that fundamentally arbitrary decisions are ‘grounded’ in objective, impartial reasoning, bestowing academic credibility on policies and processes, making it subsequently harder for others to criticise those processes. As theorists, we need to reflect on our political role and how best to foster virtuous, critical practice, if we are to avoid making contributions to the debate that not only do no good, but may even be harmful. A recent debate in this journal illustrates these issues effectively

'Word from the street' : when non-electoral representative claims meet electoral representation in the United Kingdom

Taking the specific case of street protests in the UK – the ‘word from the street’– this article examines recent (re)conceptualizations of political representation, most particularly Saward’s notion of ‘representative claim’. The specific example of nonelectoral claims articulated by protestors and demonstrators in the UK is used to illustrate: the processes of making, constituting, evaluating and accepting claims for and by constituencies and audiences; and the continuing distinctiveness of claims based upon electoral representation. Two basic questions structure the analysis: first, why would the political representative claims of elected representatives trump the nonelectoral claims of mass demonstrators and, second, in what ways does the ‘perceived legitimacy’ of the former differ from the latter

Happiness and education: troubling students for their own contentment

Currently higher education strategies seem to concentrate on the expedient, developing skills that can secure employment in the world of work. Following Dreyfus and Spinosa (2003), this may have immediate advantages, but in totalising pedagogic practices it may restrict our openness to people and to our own contentment with ourselves. Valuable as this may be as a way to satisfy politico-economic policy imperatives, it strays from education as an edifying process where personal development represents, through the facing up to distress and despair, an unsettling of our developing identity and a negation of our immediate desire satisfaction. Such an unsettling is not intended to give pleasure or satisfaction in the normative way in which the imperative of happiness has been used in student satisfaction surveys or in the wider societal context that this totalisation represents (Ahmed 2010). What I propose for higher education is not a dominant priority to feed the happiness for others but a mission to personal contentment revealed through realising student potentialities to them and so recognising their limitations as part of seeking an attunement to contentment

House of Cards as Philosophy: Democracy on Trial

Over the course of its six seasons, the Netflix show the House of Cards (HOC) details the rise to power of Claire and Frank Underwood in a fictional United States. They achieve power not by winning free and fair elections, but by exploiting various weaknesses of the U.S. political system. Could such a thing happen to our own democracies? This chapter argues that it is a threat that should be taken seriously, as the structure of HOC’s democratic institutions closely mirrors our own, and the flaws that the Underwoods exploit are precisely those that have allowed autocrats to capture democracies “from the inside.” Of even greater concern, these flaws may flow from the nature of democracy itself. This possibility is explored by considering the events of the HOC in the light of the anti-democratic arguments of Plato and Hobbes. The chapter concludes by briefly considering responses to these arguments